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Abstract :  Four major accounts of perception through a mirror 
are presented: two of them are unifier accounts (the entity one sees in 
the mirror is the same as the entity that gets refected), and two are 
multiplier accounts (the entity seen is distinct from the entity that 
gets  refected:  it  is  either  a  refection,  or  a  replica  thereof).  Most 
accounts have unwanted consequences, which manifest themselves 
by making perception through a mirror illusory one way or another. 
A unifier account is defended which reconciles metaphysical sobriety 
with epistemic un-innocence.
Keywords: mirrors; perception; illusions
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Captain Hook stands before a mirror. What does he see? Captain 
Hook has a hook in place of his right arm. But the person he sees in 
the mirror has a hook on his left arm. So it can’t be the same person. 
Yet common sense says Hook sees himself; so it must be the same 
person. How can the dilemma be resolved?
The dilemma concerns what is seen “in” a mirror. What is the 
content of perception of a subject looking at an object refected in a 
mirror, or to keep to a more neutral expression, a subject who uses a 
mirror as a visual aid? The difficulty in the answer lies in the fact that 
mirrors,  like  many  epistemic  artefacts,  offer  mediated  access  to 
reality, and such mediation appears to leave a trace (for example, in 
causing us to attribute different properties to whatever is perceived, 
as occurs with the change in position of the Captain’s hook).
We will examine some accounts - not all will seem immediately 
plausible -  that  articulate the content of perception that occurs by 
means of a mirror. For there are various possibilities, grouped around 
the  positions  of  unifiers  (Captain  Hook  is  what  is  seen)  and 
multipliers (what is seen is something other than Captain Hook).
Ordinary  parlance  oscillates  between  various  possibilities.  At 
one  extreme  it  indicates  that  one  sees  one’s  own  image  or  own 
refection in the mirror, while at the other it also allows that one looks 
at oneself in the mirror, in the sense that it is a real person that is 
seen, something in the real world rather than an image. The implied 
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ontology is different, and in the case of refections the ontology needs 
to be clarified. Obviously it is not taken for granted that linguistic 
expressions faithfully represent intuitions, also because it is possible 
that here we are dealing with a semi-technical vocabulary, partially 
derived from optics (which uses ‘image in a mirror’ in a very specific 
sense of the term ‘image’). Nevertheless let us register a descriptive 
uncertainty to be investigated by considering some possible accounts 
that articulate an answer to the question of the nature of what one 
sees using a mirror. 
An orthogonal distinction to that between seeing oneself/seeing 
an image is that of seeing oneself/seeing another person. More than 
by  ordinary  language,  here  the  distinction  is  recorded  by  our 
behaviour, which highlights the possibility of an identification error.
We  will  also  try  to  investigate  what  might  be  the  cognitive 
reasons (the explanations of the intuitions) that make us choose one 
or another account of perception through mirrors.
1. The refection theory
A first theory suggests that what is seen in the mirror is not the 
object that is refected (Captain Hook) but a refection of him. I don’t 
see  Captain  Hook  but  a  refection  of  Captain  Hook,  where  it  is 
presupposed that the refection is a different item from that of which 
it is the refection. This theory is in part faithful to common sense and 
in  part  distances  itself  from it.  The  commonsense  element  of  the 
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theory is the following. Let us say we see a refection in the mirror in 
the sense that we say we see a shadow on the ground, separating 
thereby shadows as much as refections from the objects of which 
they  are  shadow and refection.1 Shadows and refections  are  not 
categorically  homogeneous  with  the  things  of  which  they  are 
shadows and refections. A tidy way to express this intuition is to say 
one does not see the object, one sees only its refection.
The notion of refection however is very wide, and its primary 
accepted meaning includes the lighting patches that  reside on the 
surfaces of shiny objects and in which it  is not always possible to 
recognise the object that caused them.2 We limit ourselves here to the 
case where recognition is possible, so let us consider another account 
directly.
2. A variant: Images are seen in a mirror
People talk of seeing an image in the mirror; again in the sense 
where they mean to use the qualification to speak of a ‘mere image’. 
(There  is  also  a  technical  sense  of  ‘image’,  a  paramathematical 
meaning borrowed by optics, the sense of image as ‘mapping’, which 
will  not  be  discussed  here).  Talking  of  images  in  a  mirror,  while 
allowing  us  to  circumscribe  those  cases  where  one  recognises 
something in the mirror, creates a further complication, insofar as the 
1 But cf. Sorensen 1999, for cases in which perception of a shadow is perception of an 
object.
2 Cf. Cavanagh 2005. It is also necessary to ask if it is possible to specify what a reflection 
is without specifying what it is a reflection of.
5
concept of image is associated with that of representational content. 
And in practice there is a sense in which one might think that mirrors 
were vehicles of representations: a sense in which it can be said that  
the mirror represents Captain Hook. It might be objected that mirrors 
are only “mechanisms” (loosely speaking) to  refect  light,  whereas 
the  presence  of  representational  content  essentially  must  include 
reference to an intention.  However,  by introducing an appropriate 
intentional  element  one  could  answer  the  objection  that  sees  in 
mirrors mere stages in the fow of information insofar as they do not 
involve intentions. I can have the intention to use a mirror to make 
you see what you look like, or to show you what is behind you. The 
representational content of the mirror in that case would be inherited  
from  that  of  the  intention  governing  its  use.  Therefore  a  causal-
intentional  account  of  images  does  not  yet  manage  to  exclude 
automatically that looking in a mirror is like looking at an image.3 
The relevant difference must be found elsewhere. The countercheck 
of  the need to  look elsewhere  for  the  relevant  difference  between 
images and mirrors comes from the fact that some images too are 
obtained  mechanically  -  such  as  photographs.  The  element  of 
mechanical production is therefore not decisive.
One of  the possible  reasons for  holding that  actual  images  of 
things are what are seen in mirrors is a hypothetical analogy between 
the way things are seen in a mirror and the way images like pictures 
3 This piece of evidence seems to motivate the arguments in U. Eco (1985) aimed at 
showing that mirrors are not “semiotic” phenomena.
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or photographs hanging on walls are seen. This analogy is supported 
by certain rational reconstructions of the origins of painting, and in 
particular of the perspectival representation, according to which one 
way for the artist to proceed would consist in tracing on the surface 
of a transparent screen (a window) the profile of the things visible on 
the  other  side  of  the  window.4 However  we  should  beware  of 
precisely this kind of rational reconstruction.
The  unfeasibility5 of  the  method  just  described  is  evident  to 
anyone who has tried to carry it out. Parallax phenomena occur in 
looking  through  windows  that  cannot  occur  when  looking  at 
images.  The  smallest  change  in  point  of  view  causes  a  loss  of 
alignment between the profile traced on the window and the visual 
profile  of  the  thing  to  be  represented.  Indeed  here  lies  the 
fundamental difference between images and windows. Windows do 
4 Leonardo da Vinci, Trattato della Pittura, 402: “How the mirror is master of painters. 
When you want to see if your painting altogether conforms with the thing portrayed in 
nature, take a mirror, and make the live thing reflect in it, and compare the thing reflected 
with your painting, and consider well whether the subject of one and the other likeness 
conform to each other. Above all the mirror is to be taken as master, I mean the flat mirror,  
inasmuch as on its surface things have similarities with paintings in many parts; that is you 
see a painting done on a plane show things that seem in relief, and a mirror on a plane does 
the same; a painting is just a surface, a mirror is the very same; a painting is intangible, 
insofar as that which is round and distinct cannot be circled with hands, and mirrors do the 
same. Mirrors and paintings show the similarity of things surrounded by shadow and light, 
and one and the other appear well beyond their surface. And if you know that a mirror 
through features and shadows and lights makes things seem to stand out for you, and your 
having among your colours shadows and light more powerful that those of the mirror, of 
course, if you know how to compose them well together, your picture too will seem itself a 
natural thing, seen in a great mirror.”
If what I argue in this paper holds, the method Leonardo proposes is perfectly 
unusable: looking at something in a mirror does not introduce substantial differences 
compared to looking at it in reality. The passage from Leonardo’s treatise should be seen 
therefore more as a theoretical reflection on mirrors and images rather than as a series of  
practical pointers. And from a theoretical point of view it articulates - presenting them as 
obvious - some of the main points of a position that as we will see is not obvious.
5 Casati 2000.
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not  function as  images  given that  what  is  seen within a  window  
changes according to adjustments of point of view, whereas what is 
seen by means of an image resists adjustments of point of view. But 
for this same reason mirrors do not function like images either, given 
that  what  is  seen within a  mirror  changes  in  a  way regulated by 
adjustments of point of view.
One can nevertheless extract from this discussion that if in need 
of  a  useful  analogy  to  analyse  the  structure  of  the  content  of 
perception, mirrors function as windows rather than as images; and 
that in the case of mirrors it is still possible to fall back on the idea of 
image insofar as we are dealing with “windows” that show a reality 
that is different in some respects from that which exists beyond the 
surface of the mirror; by contrast with real windows, which in fact 
show the reality that exists on the other side of the window. Here we 
reconnect with the idea that mirrors present ‘mere’ images, and not 
reality in fesh and blood.
Up to  now we have  listed  some aspects  of  mirrors  that  may 
cause intuitions to lean towards the assimilation of the content of 
perception when looking in a mirror to content when looking at an 
image. Such assimilation highlights the aspect of unreality that one 
would like to associate with what is seen in the mirror, but obscures 
certain important phenomenological aspects (in particular, as we will 
see  in  section  6,  the  important  difference  between  the  content  of  
perception  of  mirrors/windows  and  images  is  given  by  the 
8
difference  between  the  rules  of  co-variation  of  content  with 
movement of observer). We might say that this assimilation is based 
on ontological intuitions about the nature of what is seen, while its 
negation is based on phenomenological aspects.
3. Unifiers vs. multipliers: the simple unifier account
An account that envisages that what is seen in the mirror is a 
refection or an image of Captain Hook but not Hook himself is a 
multiplier’s account: such an account multiplies the number of items 
relevant to the analysis of the structure of the content of perception 
through mirrors. As the supplementary entity is a refection, call the 
theory a ‘refection multiplier’  account. In opposition to multiplier 
accounts are defationary or unifier accounts. 
According to a first defationary theory, it is not an image or a 
refection of the object that is seen “in the mirror”, but the object itself 
which is refected, perhaps (but not necessarily) seen as located in the  
wrong place and provided with some odd features. There are not two 
relevant items for the structure of perceptual content, but one.6 Call 
this  the  ‘simple  unifier’  account.  On  this  account,  the 
representational content of an episode of perception where a mirror 
is used as an intermediary is not substantially different from that of 
6 We have registered the expression “to see X in the mirror”. A linguistic revision such as 
“to see X thanks to the mirror” captures an element of the unifier's account; as suggested 
above, it could be compatible with the Italian expression “vedere allo specchio”, “seeing 'at' 
the mirror”.
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an  episode  where  one  is  not  used,  aside  from  deformations 
incidentally introduced by and ascribable to the deviant causal chain.
In practice what we see in the mirror is a portion of the world:  
but, in virtue of the deviant causal chain, we represent that portion as 
if it were situated in a different place from where it is in fact located 
(for  instance,  on the  other  side  of  the  wall  in  the  hall  where  the 
mirror hangs, which we know to be the entrance to the neighbours’ 
apartment,  not ours),  and possessed of certain different properties 
from those it has (for instance, Captain Hook should have the hook 
on his right arm not his left).
At first pass, the content of perception of an object refected in a 
mirror is therefore mistaken or illusory (in some sense that needs to 
be further specified) if the object has different properties from those 
that the content ascribes, as occurs normally. I see Captain Hook in 
the mirror. When I look in the mirror it seems to me that Hook is 
missing his left arm. But when I look at Captain Hook without using 
a mirror it appears his right arm is missing. The content of normal 
perception that has Captain Hook as its  object  and the content  of 
perception that has as its object Captain Hook seen through a mirror 
therefore differ systematically in regard to certain descriptions, those 
featuring the terms ‘right’ and ‘left’.
How  does  the  simple  unifier  account  answer  the  dilemma 
outlined at the beginning of the paper? The account favours one of 
the horns of the dilemma as it subscribes to the intuition that what is 
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seen in the mirror is the same thing that produces the refection. But 
it must then explain how it is possible that things seen in the mirror 
have different  properties  from those  that  are  being mirrored.  The 
way out is to consider the content of perception through a mirror to 
be illusory. It is an illusion to have the impression of seeing the hook 
on the Captain’s left arm; it is an illusion to have the impression of 
seeing a space opening up before us when we look in the mirror.
4. The replica multiplier account
At  the  opposite  end  of  the  spectrum  lies  another  multiplier 
account that aims to resolve the dilemma in a symmetrical way to 
that  just  set  out:  by  denying  (some  aspects  of)  an  attribution  of 
illusion  and  at  the  same  time  denying  the  identity  thesis.  This 
multiplier account does not introduce items of a different type with 
respect to the objects that are mirrored, such as refections or images, 
but introduces items of the same kind and postulates that they are 
(individual)  objects  distinct  from  those  that  are  mirrored.  The 
underlying  intuition  has  been  expressed  in  Borges’  story  about 
Uqbar: mirrors are abominable because they increase the number of  
things.7 So it is not Captain Hook I would see in the mirror, but a 
replica (which by definition is  different  from Captain Hook).  This 
position also answers the mirror dilemma. It has the advantage of 
not postulating content that is mistaken about the properties of the 
7  “Then Bioy Casares recalled that one of the heresiarchs of Uqbar had declared that  
mirrors and copulation are abominable, because they increase the number or men.” J.L. 
Borges, 1940, “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbius Tertius”.
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object: the replica has exactly the properties ascribed by perceptual 
content determined by the perception of the mirror, and by definition 
that content is not mistaken about the properties it represents. The 
replica of Captain Hook is missing its  left arm and I veridically see 
that it  is missing its left  arm. In fact,  looking in the mirror would 
mean  casting  an  eye  over  another  possible  world.  The 
phenomenological comparison with windows returns here in another 
guise: it is as if a window had been opened in the wall the mirror is 
hanging on, revealing spaces and objects that are different from those 
actually on the other side of the wall.
But perceptual content has an illusory aspect as well. If I am not 
looking at Captain Hook but at a replica of him, how do I describe 
the behaviour - intentional or otherwise - of the replica? The replica 
winks. It does so at the same moment as Captain Hook (modulo the 
speed of light). Did the replica wink spontaneously? If we say yes, 
then we must consider the impression that the real Captain Hook is 
responsible  for  the  movement  to  be  an  illusion.  Of  course,  when 
looking at ourselves in the mirror, we would find it particularly hard 
to regard as an illusion the fact that what happens “in the mirror” is 
completely determined by what happens in the world beyond the 
mirror. The replica account asks us to give up the basic intuition that 
says we control our refection in the mirror.
5. The mirror illusion
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Both  the  simple  unifier  account  and  the  replica  multiplier 
account  presuppose  that  there  is  an  error  in  perception  gained 
through  a  mirror;  that  mirror  perception  generates  some  form  of 
illusion.  To  say  that  what  is  seen  through  the  mirror  is  seen  as 
incorrectly localised and is ascribed incorrect properties (defationist 
theory) presupposes a mistake just as much as does attempting to 
save the veracity of content by postulating the correct perception of a 
replica  with  systematically  different  properties  from the  object  of 
which it  is  a  replica.  One could nevertheless  object  that  the error 
presents itself only if we accept that perception through a mirror is 
epistemically innocent, that is, produced without any awareness of 
the fact that we are dealing with mirrors. If such knowledge of the 
structure of the epistemic channel is integrated with the content, that  
is,  if  we  consider  epistemic  innocence  a  myth,  then  some  of  the 
descriptive  elements  listed  above  are  overturned,  and  the 
phenomenology  of  looking  in  a  mirror  must  therefore  be 
reinterpreted. Call this the un-innocent unifier account. Looking in a 
mirror  is  not  (normally)  like  looking  through  glass,  rather  it  is 
obtaining  information  about  part  of  the  world  that  sends  to  the 
mirror the light that the observer uses to perceive the scene. Captain 
Hook is not seen erroneously on the other side of the wall on which 
the  mirror  hangs,  but  on  the  same  side  of  the  room  where  the 
observer is located; and he is seen where he is precisely because it is  
known that a mirror is in use. Equally, he is not seen in the mirror 
with a hook on his left arm but with a hook on his right arm, that is, 
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where in fact he has a hook. Note that a conspicuous advantage of 
this  position  is  that  it  allows  the  instantaneous  resolution  of  the 
discussion about mirrors that ‘invert right and left but not top and 
bottom’ (Block 1974): the idea that an “inversion” occurred was an 
artefact  of  description:  only  abstracting  from  the  fact  that  the 
refective  properties  of  mirrors  are  known  (feigning  epistemic 
innocence) could one maintain one had the impression that the hook 
had moved from the right arm to the left, and that therefore mirrors 
invert right and left. It is not content that is illusory; the illusion is the 
impression of having illusory content.
6.  Homework  for  the  un-innocent  unifier  account:  a 
sensorimotor theory of refections
The  un-innocent  unifier  account  has  on  its  side  the  generic 
advantages of ontologically parsimonious theories. Two things still 
need  to  be  shown,  however:  in  the  first  place,  that  multiplier 
accounts do not make virtuous use of the entities they postulate – 
that is, that such entities (images, refections and replicas) do not turn 
out to be indispensable or at least very useful in an account of the 
content  of  perception  through  mirrors.  Secondly,  that  epistemic 
innocence is a non-unrenounceable feature of the phenomenological 
description of perceptual content.
On the first point (uselessness of postulated entities) : We saw in 
section 2 how the notion of image that is appealed to when it is held 
that seeing “in” a mirror is like seeing “in” an image is a notion that 
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is  in  fact  used  to  stand  for  any  of  (at  least)  three  elements:  the 
paramathematical  use  of  the  term  ‘image’  (like  ‘mapping’),  the 
extenuating  clause  “only”  (as  in  “one  sees  only  an  image  in  the 
mirror”),  and  the  fact  that  images  are  representations.  The 
fundamental difference between seeing in an image and seeing in a 
mirror was given by phenomenology: the robustness of what is seen 
in the image was contrasted with the transience of what is seen using 
a mirror. If I move from right to left relative to the picture of Uncle 
Sam, his threatening finger continues to point at me; but if I move to 
the left or right of an immobile Uncle Sam that I see through a mirror,  
I can escape his pointing gesture.
Nevertheless,  phenomenology  offers  a  hold  to  classificatory 
uncertainty. If we ideally bend a fat mirror until it becomes convex, 
we alter the parameters of coordination between our movements and 
changes in the visual image. The change in visual image is in these 
conditions (relatively) minor compared to that which occurs when 
we  move  while  looking  at  a  fat  mirror.  At  the  limit,  in  cases  of 
extreme convexity, the alteration is minimal: the refections of light 
sources tend to remain anchored to the edges (curvature maxima) of 
shiny  objects.  Furthermore,  an  important  “shrinkage”  of  refected  
things can be noted in a convex mirror (think of the back of a spoon) 
compared to how they would be seen in a fat mirror.
This fact shows a phenomenological basis for what is seen in a 
mirror being attributed the character of image. We naturally tend to 
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consider refections in a convex mirror to be images insofar as they 
effectively  behave  like  images  (shrinkage  and  anchoring  to  the 
surface).  The countercheck  to  this  fact  is  suggested by  a  pin-hole 
camera8 (which projects an image through a hole onto a translucent 
wall). The camera stands to a window as a convex mirror stands to a 
mirror:  both the camera and the convex mirror  tend to freeze the 
visual scene with respect to the movements of the observer.
On the second point (giving up epistemic innocence): Someone 
might  want  to  hold  that  epistemic  un-innocence,  that  is,  the 
possibility of countenancing the structure of the epistemic channel 
when looking in a mirror,  is  not a feature of  the phenomenology. 
Indeed, an objector would maintain, mirrors can fool us in a way that 
betrays our epistemic innocence. In particular in the case where they 
really seem to open up a space before us, a space in which we have 
the  impression  we  can  embark  on  an  action.  The  reply  to  the 
objection is  two-fold.  In the  first  place,  phenomena such as  those 
described  by  the  objector  are  marginal  and  surprising:  it  rarely 
happens that we are fooled by a mirror to the extent of taking the 
virtual space as a possible space for action - a space we would like to 
walk  towards  for  example.  Secondly,  the  marginality  of  these 
phenomena  is  tied  to  the  fact  that  we  learn  to  use  mirrors 
successfully,  to  the  point  that  epistemically  un-innocent  use  of 
mirrors becomes second nature. In fact, we learn to ignore the space 
8 I owe the suggestion that a pin-hole camera is in a sense intermediate between image and 
window to Clotilde Calabi.
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on the other side of the mirror; we learn to use rear-view mirrors (in 
right-driving countries, looking in the mirror, the car behind us does 
not seem to have the steering wheel on the right). This is also why 
attempts to ‘stretch space’ by putting big mirrors in narrow houses 
are made in vain. After a short while one becomes used to ignoring 
the ‘virtual spaces’ created by the mirrors. And for this reason we are 
surprised by simple tricks like illuminating something on the other 
side of a mirror by pointing a torch beam: for we do not normally 
consider the virtual space as accessible to action.
The  un-innocent  unifier  account  that  embraces  epistemic 
innocence  at  the  phenomenological  level  is  therefore  the  best 
candidate  to  solve  the  dilemma  of  Captain  Hook.  It  solves  it  by 
denying one of the horns of the dilemma (we do not see the hook on 
the left arm of the Captain, but on the right arm, that is, where the 
Captain actually has a hook, by contrast with what is predicted by 
the simple unifier account), and accepting the other: what is seen in 
the mirror really is Captain Hook, as opposed to what the multiplier 
account predicts; we see neither a replica of him, nor his refection, as 
against  the  predictions  of  the  refection  and  replica  multiplier 
accounts respectively.
7. Morals
Some morals can be drawn from this discussion.
1
A. A first  moral invites  caution in the use of  the terminology 
adopted  to  discuss  ‘virtual  reality’.  After  all,  mirrors  provide  an 
example  of  low-tech  virtual  reality.9 In  the  case  of  mirrors,  the 
‘virtuality’ of what is seen through a mirror is nothing more than a 
turn of phrase to underline the fact that we are in the presence of a 
non-canonical  way of  collecting  information  about  the  world;  but 
what is seen is the world itself, and the individuals who inhabit it.
B.  A  second  moral  concerns  sensory-motor  accounts  of 
perception,  which  hypothesise  that  the  content  of  perception  is  a 
function of knowledge of the type of movement which the perceiver 
can carry out in certain contexts; even if there is now a consensus 
around a certain scepticism about their claim to be candidates for a 
general theory of perception (Block 2005), the intuition that guides 
them can be saved, at least locally. Sensory-motor principles work at 
the level of content to distinguish some contents of perception from 
others; in particular, here they have been useful here to distinguish 
perception through a fat mirror and a convex mirror, and to show 
how  the  latter  can  be  a  step  towards  our  notion  of  perception 
through an image.
C. A third moral concerns the use of notions such as that of an 
image,  which  have  a  double  life,  both as  ingredients  of  common 
sense and as elements of one or another theoretical account used to 
9 Cf. Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998 for terminology. Note that Ramachandran’s 
experiments use mirrors (which in this case offer a partial view) presupposing epistemic 
innocence.
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describe the world. Not to distinguish between the various meanings 
is  to  risk  creating  hybrid  accounts  that  do  not  allow  the  correct 
classification of the phenomena to be described; and a descriptively 
inadequate theory has few chances of being explanatorily adequate.10
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